

# Secure Boot

## The Right Way

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2022-10-28

# The Wrong Way

- ▶ Disable it
  - ▶ Vulnerable
  - ▶ Evil Maids
- ▶ Use a pre-signed loader
  - ▶ PreLoader and shim
  - ▶ initramfs signing
  - ▶ updates
  - ▶ encryption

# The Right Way

- ▶ PKI
- ▶ Key Creation
- ▶ Kernel Signing
- ▶ Unified Kernel Image
- ▶ Automation

- ▶ Platform Key - OEM key
- ▶ Key Exchange Key - Signed by Platform Key, Signs DBs
- ▶ Signature Database - Allow list
- ▶ Forbidden Signatures Database - Deny list

# Key Creation

## Generate UUID:

```
$ uuidgen --random > GUID.txt
```

## Platform Key:

```
$ openssl req -newkey rsa:4096 -nodes -keyout PK.key -new -x509 -sha256 \  
    -days 3650 -subj "/CN=my Platform Key/" -out PK.crt  
$ openssl x509 -outform DER -in PK.crt -out PK.cer  
$ cert-to-efi-sig-list -g "$(< GUID.txt)" PK.crt PK.esl  
$ sign-efi-sig-list -g "$(< GUID.txt)" -k PK.key -c PK.crt PK PK.esl PK.auth
```

## Key Exchange Key:

```
$ openssl req -newkey rsa:4096 -nodes -keyout KEK.key -new -x509 -sha256 \  
    -days 3650 -subj "/CN=my Key Exchange Key/" -out KEK.crt  
$ openssl x509 -outform DER -in KEK.crt -out KEK.cer  
$ cert-to-efi-sig-list -g "$(< GUID.txt)" KEK.crt KEK.esl  
$ sign-efi-sig-list -g "$(< GUID.txt)" -k PK.key -c PK.crt KEK KEK.esl KEK.auth
```

## Signature Database:

```
$ openssl req -newkey rsa:4096 -nodes -keyout db.key -new -x509 -sha256 \  
    -days 3650 -subj "/CN=my Signature Database key/" -out db.crt  
$ openssl x509 -outform DER -in db.crt -out db.cer  
$ cert-to-efi-sig-list -g "$(< GUID.txt)" db.crt db.esl  
$ sign-efi-sig-list -g "$(< GUID.txt)" -k KEK.key -c KEK.crt db db.esl db.auth
```

# Kernel Signing

We use `sbsigntools` to sign EFI binaries For example:

```
# sbsign --key db.key --cert db.crt --output /boot/vmlinuz--linux \  
/boot/vmlinuz--linux  
# sbsign --key db.key --cert db.crt --output <esp>/EFI/BOOT/BOOTx64.EFI \  
<esp>/EFI/BOOT/BOOTx64.EFI
```

These commands sign a linux kernel at `/boot/vmlinuz--linux` and a boot manager at `<esp>/EFI/BOOT/BOOTx64.EFI` with our allow database key, then replaces them with their signed versions At this we still run into the problem of having a boot manager between our firmware and our kernel, as well as that of unsigned initramfs

# Unified Kernel Images

Instead of having a separate kernel and initramfs image, we can join them into one big file. How exactly this will work depends on your system, but an example can look like:

```
# mkinitcpio -p linux -- --uefi <esp>/EFI/Linux/linux.efi
```

We can set out kernel parameters in `/etc/kernel/cmdline` to be built into our initramfs. We then add the following to the `mkinitcpio` presets for the kernels we are using:

```
<preset>_efi_image="<esp>/EFI/Linux/linux.efi"
```

This will result in a bootable efi binary that we can sign like in the previous slide, but without the added vulnerability of unsigned initramfs and a boot manager

# Automation

Some ideas for how to make this process easier (imagine manually signing your kernel every time there's an update)

- ▶ `sbkeysync` - Easily enroll your keys in the firmware once you generate them
- ▶ Package manager hooks
  - ▶ `/etc/pacman.d/hooks`
  - ▶ `/etc/apt/apt.conf.d`
- ▶ Scripts - automate the commands needed to sign your kernel
- ▶ `sbupdate` - AUR package with sane defaults to make kernel images once you have your keys